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IS THERE A CONSTITUTIONAL COMMON
GOOD?
R. GEORGE WRIGHT†
INTRODUCTION
Identifying and pursuing some widely shared idea of the
common good seems central to a sustainable constitutional order.
This may seem especially true in an era of deep political division.
The problem, though, is that such political division may indeed
heighten the need for recognizing and promoting a shared
constitutional common good, while, at the same time, preventing
such an identification and pursuit of any such common good. What
is needed is a way to disrupt this vicious circle. This Article is an
illustration of the operation of this vicious circle and, more
optimistically, a proffering of the means by which this vicious
circle can ultimately be disrupted. To some degree, increased
attention to familiar basic virtues can perform the vital
constructive role.
Consider first, as an entryway, the idea of polarization itself.
The United States has long experienced increasing polarization in
the constitutional realm.1 The idea of polarization, of course,
implies clustering at opposite ends of a spectrum. But the idea of
increased polarization in this sense actually tells us little. We
need to know much more about the specific nature of our
polarization.
The metaphor of polarization itself does not, for example, tell
us whether the polarization process has been accelerating. It does
not tell us about the “distance” between the poles—or whether that
distance has itself been increasing. It does not tell us whether
there is more than one, or perhaps many, distinct axes of polarity.
It does not tell us about the causes, grounds, emotional intensity,
or stability of the polarization. Nor does the idea of polarization
itself tell us about any asymmetries of the polarization, including
the relative sizes and differing degrees of fervency and
implacability at the relevant poles. And the idea of polarization
†
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certainly does not capture any sense of resulting fragmentation,
disintegration, or other possible eventual outcomes. The idea of
polarization itself thus does not capture anything like the essence
of our contentious circumstances in matters of constitutional law.
We explore a number of the further complications of polarization
below.
One possible response to constitutional-level polarization and
its various complications on clearly vital matters would be to
encourage increased attention to the idea of a genuine common
good in the constitutional realm.2 How, one might imagine, could
anyone responsibly object to an increased focus on identifying and
appropriately pursuing a genuine common good at the
constitutional level? Attention to a genuine common good need not
distract from equally genuine injustice. Indeed, such attention
should heighten, and intensify, our concern for basic injustices.
Surprisingly, though, there turns out to be only a modest
payoff in focusing directly on the idea of a constitutional common
good. There are, to begin with, serious problems in defining and
conceptually analyzing the very idea of a common good, in general
and at the constitutional level.3 And there are then even more
complex problems in meaningfully identifying the genuine
common good, in substantive terms, in virtually any interesting
case.4
It is not as though there is currently a reasonably broad
consensus on the constitutional common good at a fairly general
level, with disputes on the details. Instead, what is crucially
missing is anything like a reasonably broad consensus on even
fundamental constitutional matters. Our basic disputes are then
typically compounded, rather than mitigated, across substantive
policy issues. The result is that attempting to define, identify, and
promote a constitutional common good will, inevitably, largely just
mirror the substance, and the pathologies, of our constitutional
disputes as they already stand.
Debates that are directly focused on a constitutional common
good will thus largely just reinscribe, or unproductively translate,
our familiar current constitutional arguments into the terms of the
search for a purported common good. And this is hardly a matter
of squabbling over issues of relative detail. Largely recasting our
present constitutional disputes in terms of identifying and
2
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pursuing a genuine common good, however initially appealing,
thus turns out to be hardly worth the effort.5
This surprising conclusion indeed holds, but with an
important qualification.6 Even if the idea of a meaningful
substantive constitutional common good is otherwise an illusion,
investigating that idea can inadvertently steer us, more
constructively, toward what most cultures think of as basic virtues
and vices of character. Those virtues and vices certainly have, in
context, their own controversial constitutional-level implications.
It is easy, in our culture, to deny virtue in one’s political opponents.
But the genuine basic virtues have real survival value for those
who cultivate them, and, crucially, much broader social value as
well. Basic virtues have important favorable spill-over effects.
The basic virtues and vices hold, ultimately, some potential for
helping to identify, and then to meaningfully contribute toward
furthering, whatever we then may take the constitutional common
good to involve.7
I. THE QUESTION OF A CONSTITUTIONAL COMMON GOOD: THE
CURRENT CULTURAL CONTEXT
Of late, it has been claimed that our current political culture
is one of rising extremism.8 This may well be true of our present
moment.9 But it is also clearly established that the underlying
bases for political extremism10—along with polarization,11 mutual

5

See infra Parts II–III.
See infra Conclusion.
7
See id.
8
See, e.g., Anne Applebaum, The Answer to Extremism Isn’t More Extremism,
ATLANTIC (Oct. 30, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/10/leftand-right-are-radicalizing-each-other/616914/ [https://perma.cc/HLL8-QB2J]. Given
the “Prisoner’s Dilemma” quality of our contemporary politics, it is more common to
condemn the extremism of one’s political opponents than to condemn any broader
phenomenon of increasing extremism that might also encompass one’s own views. See
generally Steven Kuhn, Prisoner’s Dilemma, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Apr. 2,
2019), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/prisoner-dilemma [https://perma.cc/R7XXGJFJ].
9
See Applebaum, supra note 8.
10
See, e.g., LILLIANA MASON, UNCIVIL AGREEMENT: HOW POLITICS BECAME OUR
IDENTITY 3 (2018); J.M. Berger, Our Consensus Reality Has Shattered, ATLANTIC (Oct.
9, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/10/year-living-uncertainly/
616648/ [https://perma.cc/3ZKR-P9XY].
11
See, e.g., JONATHAN HAIDT, THE RIGHTEOUS MIND: WHY GOOD PEOPLE ARE
DIVIDED BY POLITICS AND RELIGION 319–66 (2012); EZRA KLEIN, WHY WE’RE
POLARIZED xiv (2020); ROBERT B. TALISSE, OVERDOING DEMOCRACY: WHY WE MUST
PUT POLITICS IN ITS PLACE 95–127 (2019).
6
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distrust,12 mutual hostility,13 and elements of fragmentation and
disintegration14— have actually been developing over a relatively
long period.
Unsurprisingly, then, is the survey evidence demonstrating
that negative “partisan stereotyping has increased by 50 percent
between 1960 and 2010.”15 As of 1975, the sociologist Robert
Nisbet detected “a profound distrust of the political order, . . . and
indeed of the whole political habit of mind that has been so
ascendant in the West for several centuries now.”16 Since the
1960s, “[p]olitical trust, trust in government and democracy, has
fallen steeply.”17 This reduced trust has occurred across the
political spectrum.18 And this broad-based increase in distrust has
accompanied a similar increase, over a period of decades,19 in
politically-valanced dislike, hostility, and even loathing.20 In an
“escalating cycle,”21 voters—including political independents22 and
relative moderates23—have gradually “grown to dislike the
opposing party . . . more than they like their own party.”24

12
Distrust may, of course, be deserved or undeserved, to any degree. Some
regimes and groups are deeply untrustworthy. On declining political trust over an
extended time period, see, e.g., ROBERT NISBET, TWILIGHT OF AUTHORITY 14 (1975);
KEVIN VALLIER, TRUST IN A POLARIZED AGE 1 (2020); Jack Citrin & Laura Stoker,
Political Trust in a Cynical Age, 21 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 49, 59 (2018); FRANCIS
FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF PROSPERITY 150
(1995).
13
Hostility may also be either deserved or undeserved. For a sense of the
development of increased hostility and political animus over time, see BILL BISHOP,
THE BIG SORT: WHY THE CLUSTERING OF LIKE-MINDED AMERICANS IS TEARING US
APART 5 (2009); MASON, supra note 10, at 6; Alan Abramowitz & Steven Webster,
‘Negative
Partisanship’
Explains
Everything,
POLITICO
MAG.,
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/09/05/negative-partisanship-explainseverything-215534/ [https://perma.cc/6ZP3-VPLQ] (last visited Oct. 27, 2022); Lee
Drutman, How Hatred Came to Dominate American Politics, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Oct.
5, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/how-hatred-negativepartisanship-came-to-dominate-american-politics/ [https://perma.cc/LTG3-TXB9].
14
See, e.g., Alasdair MacIntyre, Politics, Philosophy and the Common Good, in
THE MACINTYRE READER 235, 243 (Kelvin Knight ed., 1998).
15
MASON, supra note 10, at 3 (citing Shanto Iyengegar et al., Affect, Not Ideology:
A Social Identity Perspective on Polarization, 76 PUB. OP. Q. 405, 420 (2012)).
16
NISBET, supra note 12, at 14.
17
VALLIER, supra note 12, at 1.
18
See id. Some or all of this reduced trust may again be entirely justified.
19
See Abramowitz & Webster, supra note 13; Drutman, supra note 13.
20
See sources cited supra note 19.
21
Drutman, supra note 13.
22
See Abramowitz & Webster, supra note 13.
23
See id.
24
Id.
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Again, political distrust and animosity may, depending on
context, be entirely justified and appropriate—if not actually
insufficient, under the circumstances. Distrust is the sensible
response to sustained injustice. For our purposes, we need make
no such assessments. Our present aim is merely to provide data
points for the inference that broad agreement, across partisan
lines, on any substantively meaningful content of a constitutional
common good seems to have been evaporating over time.
Decades ago, Alasdair MacIntyre argued that “we now inhabit
a social order whose institutional heterogeneity and diversity of
interests is such that no place is left any longer for a politics of the
common good.”25 Accordingly, one might easily argue that political
polarization, extremism, distrust, and hostility—whether fully
justified or not—impair the possibility of a collective pursuit of a
meaningful constitutional common good.
It is far from clear, though, that a healthy constitutional
politics can survive the absence of a collective pursuit of a
meaningful common good. Further, it is similarly unclear that
there can be a legitimate constitutional order in the absence of a
sufficiently recognized common good.
There are certainly
mainstream traditions that have emphasized the central
importance of identifying, and promoting, a political common good.
These traditions clearly have a distinguished pedigree.
Thus, for Aristotle, the raison d’être of the city-state is
promoting the cooperative arrangements by which persons and
families can genuinely live well.26 More simply, “[l]iving well . . . is
the end of the city.”27 Cicero28 and Augustine29 similarly refer, in
their own terms, to a civic common good. Thomas Aquinas devotes
substantial attention to the idea of civic, legal, or political common
25
MacIntyre, supra note 14, at 239. MacIntyre goes on to argue that legitimate
political authority requires a sufficient pursuit of the political common good. See id.
at 243.
26
See ARISTOTLE, POLITICS bk. 3, at 95 (Carnes Lord trans., Univ. Chi. Press 2d
ed. 2013) (c. 350 B.C.E.).
27
Id.; but cf. Thomas W. Smith, Aristotle on the Conditions for and Limits of the
Common Good, 93 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 625, 626 (1999) (“Aristotle is not optimistic
about the possibility of [a] common good.”).
28
See MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, ON THE COMMONWEALTH AND ON THE LAWS bk.
1, at 21 (James E. G. Zetzel ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1999) (c. 56–51 B.C.E.)
(referring to an original unity of belief as to appropriate laws and the desire for mutual
advantage).
29
See SAINT AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD 74 (Vernon J. Bourke ed., Gerald G.
Walsh et al. abridged trans., Image Books 1958) (c. 426 A.D.) (asserting that some
genuine common good is required for there to be a genuine “people” or
“commonwealth” in the first place).
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good.30 In the modern era, Rousseau’s famous notion of the
“General Will” may be best understood as akin to the idea of the
common good.31 At the time of the Constitution’s framing, James
Madison argued that “[t]he aim of every political Constitution is
or ought to be first to obtain for rulers, men who possess most
wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue the common good of
the society.”32 And the great English progressive T.H. Green later
linked the idea of genuine self-realization, or flourishing, to an
expanded scope of the common good.33
In particular, the broadly conceived “republican tradition in
political theory has long insisted on the centrality of the notion of
the common good.”34
The public interest, understood as
synonymous with the common good, is often taken to be the
ultimate goal—and the final appeal—in matters of public policy.35
That is, the pursuit of the common good has been said to be “[t]he
most essential function of authority.”36
On the other hand, the traditional sense that the common
good can be identified and promoted, or at least that there is some
practical need for the concept,37 is not, at present, uniformly

30
See, e.g., ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, Part II, Question 90,
Article 2 (Kevin Knight online ed. 2017) (1266–1273), https://www.newadvent.org/
summa/2090.htm [https://perma.cc/54X7-UJ5Y]; see also ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, DE
REGNO: ON KINGSHIP TO THE KING OF CYPRUS bk. 1, at paras. 8–9 (Gerald B. Phelan
trans., 1949), https://isidore.co/aquinas/english/DeRegno.htm [https://perma.cc/HJ248WJD]. For commentary, see generally MARY M. KEYS, AQUINAS, ARISTOTLE, AND THE
PROMISE OF THE COMMON GOOD (2006); Richard A. Crofts, The Common Good in the
Political Theory of Thomas Aquinas, 37 THOMIST: SPECULATIVE Q. REV. 155 (1973).
31
See Patrick Riley, A Possible Explanation of Rousseau’s General Will, 64 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 86, 88 (1970).
32
James Madison, The Federalist No. 57, in THE FEDERALIST WITH LETTERS OF
“BRUTUS” 277, 277 (Terence Ball ed., 2003).
33
See T.H. GREEN, PROLEGOMENA TO ETHICS § 244, at 287–88 (David O. Brink
ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2003). For commentary, see David O. Brink, PERFECTIONISM
AND THE COMMON GOOD: THEMES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF T.H. GREEN 53 (2003). For
a brief but helpful survey of historical understandings of the political common good,
see generally B.J. Diggs, The Common Good as Reason for Political Action, 83 ETHICS
283 (1973).
34
Philip Pettit, The Common Good, in JUSTICE AND DEMOCRACY: ESSAYS FOR
BRIAN BARRY 150, 150 (Keith Dowding et al. eds., 2004).
35
See C.W. Cassinelli, Some Reflections on the Concept of the Public Interest, 69
ETHICS 48, 48 (1958); Michael Pakaluk, Is the Common Good of Political Society
Limited and Instrumental?, 55 REV. METAPHYSICS 57, 57 (2001) (discussing the
common good as the aim of political society).
36
Yves R. Simon, Common Good and Common Action, 22 REV. POL. 202, 228
(1960) (emphasis omitted).
37
See DAVID HOLLENBACH, THE COMMON GOOD AND CHRISTIAN ETHICS 18 (2002)
(citing MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 183 (1982)).
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endorsed. A merely “thin sense of the common good”38 may now
seem more plausible than any of the traditional, more robust
formulations.39 There may currently seem to be no set of public
policies that promote a good that is genuinely common or
uniformly shared.40
In that sense, it has been argued, “our search for the common
good has become increasingly problematic.”41 More broadly, it has
been said that the idea of a genuine, meaningful common good is
losing its traditional cultural hold.42 At the extreme, it has even
been claimed that “talk about the common good has been all but
abandoned.”43 The latter claim, though, is clearly exaggerated.44
In fact, the idea of a common good, particularly at the
constitutional level, is of much current interest, and is frequently
endorsed from a range of political perspectives.45 The basic
problem, though, as we shall now begin to consider, is two-fold.
First, we have nothing approaching a meaningful consensus on the
very meaning of the idea of a common good—whether at the
constitutional or any other level. The very concept itself is thus
contested and equivocal. And second, even if we could agree on
the analysis of a constitutional or other common good, we would
still have only a multiplicity of scattered and diverging views on
what, at even a general policy level, a constitutional or other
common good would substantively require. Ultimately, any
attempt to pursue these differences of basic policy substance would
largely track, if perhaps even more irreconcilably, the familiar
political contestations of the day.

38
George Duke, The Common Good, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO NATURAL
LAW JURISPRUDENCE 369, 369 (George Duke & Robert P. George eds., 2017).
39
See id.
40
See Pettit, supra note 34, at 152 (“Is it plausible, then, that among the sets of
practices and policies that a state might put in place, there is one that is in the
avowable net interest of each? I think not.”). For a historical anticipation, see FRANCES
HUTCHESON, AN ESSAY ON THE NATURE AND CONDUCT OF THE PASSIONS AND
AFFECTIONS, WITH ILLUSTRATIONS ON THE MORAL SENSE 78 (Aaron Garrett ed., 2002)
(referring to inevitable “different Opinions of publick Good, and of the Means of
promoting it”).
41
HANS SLUGA, POLITICS AND THE SEARCH FOR THE COMMON GOOD 4 (2014).
42
See id.
43
Thomas W. Smith, Aristotle on the Conditions for and Limits of the Common
Good, 93 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 625, 625 (1999). Professor Smith, however, immediately
cites a number of twentieth century exponents of a robust sense of the political
common good. See id.
44
See supra Part I and infra Parts II–III.
45
See supra Part I and infra Parts II–III.
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II. WHAT IS THE MEANING OF THE COMMON GOOD?
The idea of the common good, particularly in constitutional
contexts, begins to unravel, and to lose its apparent importance,
when we investigate the very meaning of the concept. The
abstract analytical framework of the idea of the public interest
might seem uncontroversial. Consider the four-part typology
offered by Professor Felix Oppenheim with respect to the public
interest.46 On this typology, one might claim that “it is in the
interest of public P that government G enact policy [X] in situation
S.”47 Whether we choose to distinguish the common good from the
public interest or not, we might hold, in parallel, that the common
good—or the constitutional common good in particular—could
take the form of a government, or some private actor, enacting or
otherwise adopting policy X in situation S.48 The idea of a policy
might here be construed broadly, perhaps encompassing anything
from a specific contextualized choice to a universally broad basic
principle. And correspondingly, the “situation” referred to might
range from specific, unrepeatable circumstances to the broad
human condition itself. Each of these options would then be
subject to debate.
Even the term “common good” itself is analytically divisible,
and itself open to dispute. As we shall see, the sense in which the
good is thought to be “common” is importantly controversial.49 And
the sense or senses in which the common good is “good” is also
subject to important dispute, well before we reach the level of even
the most basic policy choices.50 Thus, what counts as common,51
and what counts as good,52 already begin to unravel and
undermine the usefulness of the concept.
Among the most immediate problems is that of deciding
whether the common good must be genuinely common, in the
sense of being somehow good for everyone—or, perhaps, just

46

See Felix E. Oppenheim, Self-Interest and Public Interest, 3 POL. THEORY 259,
260 (1975).
47
Id.
48
See id.
49
See infra Part II.
50
See id.
51
See Leslie Green, Law, Co-ordination, and the Common Good, 3 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. 299, 303 (1983).
52
See id.
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nearly everyone—or whether a policy that promotes the genuine
common good can have distinct winners and substantial losers.53
If the common good is genuinely common, it makes logical
sense to conclude that something is in the common good, or “a
public interest . . . if (and only if) it is an interest of everyone.”54
But it is equally arguable that theories of the common good, and
of the public interest, should recognize the possibility of real
conflicts between public and individual or group interests.55 The
idea of balancing the common good against the rights and interests
of individuals seems natural to some.56
More concretely, cases such as reliance on fair but competitive
examinations for desirable positions,57 and the practice of the
acceptance and rejection of suitors,58 have been raised. At a
constitutional level, could the common good require, say, severe
and disproportionate sacrifice of identifiable groups in time of
war? More so, could the common good, at a constitutional level,
require substantial redistributive transfers of wealth and
opportunities among identifiable groups?
In his brief treatment of the idea of a common good, John
Rawls refers to “certain general conditions that are in an
appropriate sense equally to everyone’s advantage.”59 Perhaps
some would wish to preserve the idea that the common good is
indeed common to all by distinguishing between the common good
as an abstract, general policy, and the common good as it is
actually pursued or implemented, in some specific context, with

53
See, e.g., JONATHAN CROWE, NATURAL LAW AND THE NATURE OF LAW 88 (2019)
[hereinafter CROWE, NATURAL LAW] (referring to “all members” of the community);
Duke, supra note 38, at 376 (referring to the flourishing of “each individual” (emphasis
omitted)). This distinction assumes that the uncompensated substantial losers are at
all times recognized as members of the relevant public, or of the community, rather
than being classified, and marginalized, as outsiders.
54
Theodore M. Benditt, The Public Interest, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 291, 299 (1973).
Professor Benditt then goes on, controversially, to specify that the public interest
cannot be something that can be fulfilled or realized by one’s own efforts, or by the
efforts of one or more groups, apart from the relevant government. See id.
55
See VIRGINIA HELD, THE PUBLIC INTEREST AND INDIVIDUAL INTERESTS vii–viii
(1970).
56
See Amitai Etzioni, Common Good, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POL. THOUGHT 1,
3 (Michael T. Gibbons ed. 2015). Etzioni treats the common good and the public
interest as synonymous. See id. At the constitutional level, see the reference to the
“general Welfare” in U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1.
57
See F. Rosamond Shields, The Notion of a Common Good, in 14 PROC.
ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 274, 286 (1914).
58
See id.
59
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 217 (rev. ed. 1999).
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distinct winners and losers.60 Whether we would wish to say that
it is in the interest of a particular person to be drafted into the
infantry and sent into ferocious battle, even in a “just” war, may
still remain subject to contest.
Then there is the further basic problem of what we might call
the independent constituent elements of the common good. This
problem is especially acute at the constitutional level. That is,
typically, the common good is not a matter of homogeneous,
interchangeable units of pure goodness, or of any other
constituent. Rather, the common good is constituted by some sort
of combination of distinguishable components. The common good
seems to have a number of interacting elements.
What these particular components of the common good are
thought to be often varies. The political common good, for Thomas
Aquinas, is thought to comprise justice, peace, and wellorderedness.61 For Jacques Maritain, the common good requires,
or presupposes, not just preservation, but justice62 and “moral
goodness” itself.63 Professor Alexander Tsesis finds equality of
rights, or liberal equality, to be constitutive of the common good at
the constitutional level.64
The listing of essential components of the common good could
then be expanded to include “peace, order, prosperity, justice, and
community.”65 Even more elaborately, the common good could be
said to depend upon the interacting elements “of justice, of
freedom, security, order, morality, happiness, individual wellbeing, prosperity, progress, and what have you.”66 Or one might
identify the common good with the “flourishing”67 of both the

60
See id.; Brian M. Barry, The Use and Abuse of “The Public Interest”, in 5 NOMOS:
THE PUBLIC INTEREST 191, 203–04 (Carl J. Friedrich ed., 1962).
61
See Duke, supra note 38, at 374.
62
See Jacques Maritain, The Person and the Common Good, 8 REV. POL. 419, 438
(1946).
63
See id.
64
See Alexander Tsesis, Maxim Constitutionalism: Liberal Equality for the
Common Good, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1609, 1612–13 (2013).
65
Bruce Douglass, The Common Good and the Public Interest, 8 POL. THEORY 103,
104 (1980) (referring to the classical natural law tradition). Professor Douglass seeks
to distinguish the common good from the public interest, for his particular purposes,
while acknowledging that the two concepts can be treated as synonyms. See id. at 103.
66
SLUGA, supra note 41, at 2.
67
Duke, supra note 38, at 376 (emphasis omitted).
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relevant community as an entity,68 and of each individual member
of that community.69
On all of these approaches, the government is not to ascertain
and promote the common good in the expectation that qualities
such as justice, well-orderedness, happiness, morality, and
flourishing will follow therefrom, as results. These goods—
including justice, progress, morality, flourishing, and the like—are
not merely the results of implementing some separate and
independent common good. Rather, these various goods make up,
or constitute, the common good. They are the elements of any
common good. There is not some interesting common good that
preexists these various listed goods.
But this means that most of the work, most of the real
controversy, and most of the real interest value must already be
exhausted before the government chooses to do anything based on,
or in the name of, the common good. Before we have a common
good to promote, or to guide our policy choices, we must, for
example, have already settled upon what justice broadly
requires.70 But if we have already resolved what justice broadly
requires, for purposes of constituting a common good, the basic
problems of law and politics, in this context, have already been
largely solved. If we have indeed generally agreed, for example,
on what justice at the constitutional level requires, then there is
surprisingly little of consequence left for the idea of the common
good to actually do. And if we cannot agree on what constitutional
justice generally requires,71 we cannot possibly agree on a common
good of which justice is a crucial element. The idea of the common
good thus depends upon the prior general resolution of the major

68

See id.
See id.; see also Jonathan Crowe, Intelligibility, Practical Reason, and the
Common Good, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON NATURAL THEORY 296, 296 (Jonathan
Crowe & Constance Youngwon Lee eds., 2019) [hereinafter Crowe, Intelligibility]
(referring to “a wide and generally accessible array of modes of human flourishing”);
George Duke, Finnis on the Authority of Law and the Common Good, 19 LEGAL
THEORY 44, 45 (2013) (discussing Finnis on the “flourishing of the citizens of a political
community”); John M. Finnis, What Is the Common Good, and Why Does It Concern
the Client’s Lawyer?, 40 S. TEX. L. REV. 41, 42–43 (1999) (discussing the flourishing
and the common good). Classically, Leibniz identifies the public good with “the
advancement toward perfection of men,” while also equating the common good with
contributing “to the glory of God.” GOTTFRIED WILHELM LEIBNIZ, POLITICAL WRITINGS
105 (Patrick Riley ed. & trans. 2d ed. 1988) (c. 1695).
70
See, e.g., supra notes 61–62, 65–66 and accompanying text.
71
See infra Part III (discussing the proposed constitutional revisions).
69
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constitutional issues, and is largely a mere expression of that
resolution.
Much the same thing could be said of any other plausible
constituent element of the common good. The idea of flourishing—
as individuals, or in some collective sense—may indeed also help
to constitute the common good.72 But what flourishing in this
sense requires is as contested and as controversial as what justice
requires.73 Similarly, of course, for constituents such as morality,74
progress,75 happiness,76 or equality.77 Any agreement on what
these latter elements require would itself be the crucially
meaningful achievement. Redescribing that agreement in terms
of a common good would then be of little independent significance.
One might argue, though, that there is still a useful role for
the concept of the common good to play. The various goods such
as justice, peace, progress, flourishing, and equality, however we
may expand or contract such a list, is likely to remain plural in
character. More than one element will thus likely comprise the
overall common good, at the constitutional or any other level. And
these various goods could presumably come into important conflict
with one another. Perhaps in a given situation we might believe
that the goods of, say, peace and progress are in unavoidable
conflict. Or that the good of morality conflicts with the good of
happiness. Even if we cannot actually commensurate such
conflicting goods,78 we must somehow adjudicate such basic value
conflicts. Perhaps we could somehow then say that attempting to
reconcile and accommodate the conflicts among the constituent
elements of the common good is, however paradoxically, itself the
task of identifying and pursuing the common good.
The problem here, though, is that the idea of a common good,
apart from its constituent elements, cannot possibly bring much
in the way of useful resources for resolving such conflicts among
its own constituent goods. The idea of the common good itself
72

See supra notes 67–69 and accompanying text.
For merely one prominent, but inescapably controversial, such approach to
flourishing, see MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES: THE HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT APPROACH 32–34 (2011).
74
See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
75
See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
76
See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
77
See supra note 64 and accompanying text. For a sense of the multidimensional
disputes over what distributional and constitutional equality require, see generally R.
George Wright, Equal Protection and the Idea of Equality, 34 L. & INEQ. 1 (2016).
78
See generally John Finnis Natural Law and Legal Reasoning, 38 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 1, 8–10 (1990).
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simply does not meaningfully answer questions of such
constituent value conflicts.79
Ironically, though, one or more of the constituent elements of
the common good may itself take on a broader role in adjudicating
potential conflicts among all such elements. Consider, as possible
candidates for such an adjudicatory role, the concept of justice, or
of morality. In a higher and broader sense, justice might well be
thought to potentially adjudicate among conflicts over goods. How
it would properly do so is of course itself contested.80 But it would
clearly seem entirely inappropriate, particularly at the
constitutional level, for a government to announce that in light of
particular tradeoffs among goods, the government has chosen a
path that is, overall, admittedly unjust. Similarly, it would be
entirely odd to defend any such choice as the best value conflict
resolution that is, in a broad sense, overall morally indefensible.
Any such admission would be a disqualifier. Of course, there are
no uncontroversial routes to properly—or, one might say “justly”—
adjudicating among conflicts among the components of the
common good.81 But the idea of the common good, apart from its
components, clearly cannot resolve any such conflicts.
The nature of the common good is fundamentally contested in
a further respect. The leading exponents of the idea of a common
good have been unable to establish the basic relation between
79

Consider, in this context, “[t]he Buck-Passing Account of the Common Good”
offered by Professors Beerbohm and Davis, according to which the common good
merely “consists in the fact that there are [unspecified] reasons to act together to bring
it about.” Eric Beerbohm & Ryan W. Davis, The Common Good: A Buck-Passing
Account, 25 J. POL. PHIL. e60, e64 (2017) (emphasis omitted). Note that Beerbohm and
Davis treat the ideas of justice and the common good as distinct concepts, with both
serving as guides to political decision making. See id. at e60–e61.
80
Contrast, respectively, the largely contractualist justice of RAWLS, supra note
59, at xi–ii, xciii; the libertarian justice of ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND
UTOPIA 150–52 (1974); the communitarian justice of MICHAEL J. SANDEL, JUSTICE:
WHAT’S THE RIGHT THINGS TO DO? 6 (2009); the socialism of G.A. COHEN, RESCUING
JUSTICE AND EQUALITY 1–2 (2008); and the natural law approach to justice in JOHN
FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 198–225 (2d ed. 2011). For the argument
that for Rawls, the common good of citizens itself requires limits on any public policy
recourse to “comprehensive” religious and other metaphysically grounded moral
beliefs, see Samuel Freeman, Democracy, Religion & Public Reason, 149 DAEDALUS
37, 37, 40, 44 (2020).
81
Consider, in this regard, the conclusion of Professor Michael Sandel, a leading
contemporary champion of pursuing the common good, to the effect that “the common
good is inescapably contestable.” MICHAEL J. SANDEL, THE TYRANNY OF MERIT:
WHAT’S BECOME OF THE COMMON GOOD? 214 (2020). See generally W.B. Gallie,
Essentially Contested Concepts, 56 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 167, 167–69 (1956);
WILLIAM E. CONNOLLY, THE TERMS OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE 10 (3d ed. 1993).
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individual persons and the common good. It is possible to start in
on this problem by observing that the common good, as promoted
by our governing institutions, helps to make us who we are, and
in that sense contributes to the forming of our very identities as
persons.82 While this is undoubtedly true, it is also true that any
regime—whether traditionalist, liberal, radical, unserious, or
purely decadent—can equally contribute to the very identity of its
constituent members.83 A regime that seeks, or promotes, the
common good does not seem in this respect at all distinctive.
More broadly, the relationship between individual persons or
groups and the common good has long been contested. At the most
basic level, there are various sorts of individualists,84 and various
sorts of collectivists,85 with respect to a common good.86 On one
formulation, it is said that “[w]hereas individualists argue that the
common good can always be reduced to the goods of individuals,
collectivists maintain that some common goods are ‘irreducibly
social.’ ”87 We do seem to experience harms and benefits as
individuals. But there is also a sense that, say, the victory of a
sports team is shared by all of the teammates, and perhaps even
by the team’s fans, as a common, and in some sense deeply shared,
victory.88
The basic controversies as to the very nature of the common
good in this respect have been further developed in differing ways
by the leading contemporary natural law theorists; in particular,
by John Finnis,89 Mark Murphy,90 and Jonathan Crowe.91
82

See C.C. Pecknold, False Notions of the Common Good, FIRST THINGS (Apr. 23,
2020),
https://www.firstthings.com/web-exclusives/2020/04/false-notions-of-thecommon-good [https://perma.cc/6WWE-JS5X].
83
See, e.g., PLATO, THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO bks. VIII–IX, at 270–318 (John
Llewlyn Davies & David James Vaughan trans., MacMillan and Co. Press 1935) (c.
360 B.C.E.).
84
See William Rehg, Solidarity and the Common Good: An Analytical Framework,
38 J. SOC. PHIL. 7, 9, 12–13 (2007).
85
See id. at 7.
86
See id.
87
Id. (footnote omitted).
88
See Benjamin L. Smith, The Meaning and Importance of Common Goods, 80
THE THOMIST: SPECULATIVE Q. REV. 583, 587 (2016) (“The victory of the army is
shared by all its parts . . . .”).
89
See generally JOHN FINNIS, supra note 80, at 154–56, 459.
90
See generally MARK C. MURPHY, NATURAL LAW IN JURISPRUDENCE AND
POLITICS 61–90 (2006); Mark C. Murphy, The Common Good, 59 REV. METAPHYSICS
133 (2005) [hereinafter Murphy, The Common Good]. See generally George Duke, The
Distinctive Common Good, 78 REV. POL. 227, 227–44 (2016).
91
See generally CROWE, NATURAL LAW, supra note 53, at 85–91; Crowe,
Intelligibility, supra note 69, at 300–03.
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Professor Murphy, specifically, has classified natural law
approaches to the common good as, by their nature, either
instrumental or aggregative, or else as focused on what is called a
“distinctive [common] good.”92
On this typology, instrumental theories of the common good
focus on the conditions that are the means by which community
members can promote their own chosen goals.93 Those individual
goals may certainly take into account, altruistically, the well-being
of other persons. On the aggregative view, the focus is on the
actual realization of the goods of persons, perhaps, but not
necessarily, by adding up gains and losses in fulfilment under
alternative public policies.94 On the final, or “distinctive” common
good approach, the focus is instead on some genuinely shared,
holistic, indivisible good of the community as an entity—above and
beyond the aggregated goods of individuals.95 And it is possible to
attempt to combine two or more of these approaches.96
The arguments for and against each of these approaches
unfortunately establish the continuingly contested nature of the
common good. How the government is to best aggregate or
otherwise accommodate variously overlapping and conflicting
goods, particularly when community members may care for one
another’s good in various ways, remains unresolved.
The
underlying idea of persons “sharing” an interest remains murky
and ambiguous.97 And whether there really is a perhaps
supremely valuable common good that transcends the interests of
the community members also remains disputed.98
92

See Murphy, The Common Good, supra note 90, at 136.
See id.; CROWE, NATURAL LAW, supra note 53, at 88–90; Crowe, Intelligibility,
supra note 69, at 300–01.
94
See supra notes 92–93.
95
See supra notes 92–93.
96
See CROWE, supra note 53, at 90. John Finnis attempts to combine an emphasis
on an instrumental approach to the common good with a concern for the intrinsic value
of mutual assistance, and “the common good that consists in the all-inclusive and
intrinsically desirable flourishing of [the] community.” FINNIS, supra note 80, at 459.
For a contrasting methodological individualism, see Richard A. Epstein, The Problem
with “Common Good Constitutionalism”, HOOVER INST. (Apr. 6, 2020),
https://www.hoover.org/research/problem-common-good-constitutionalism
[https://perma.cc/6EU2-U8DM].
97
Note, for example, that persons who never interact can still share an interest
in say, craft beer brewing. Fans who never interact can share an interest in a favorite
team’s success, and then in some sense join in its official celebration. Persons can,
presumably in a different and stronger sense, share an interest in the common good
of their friendship. And the common good of a marriage may be yet further distinctive.
98
See supra note 96.
93
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Each of these fundamental conceptual issues presents
alternative branching paths for the identification and the pursuit
of the common good. But the most dramatic problems for any
attempt to rely on the idea of a common good, particularly at the
constitutional level, actually lie elsewhere. As we shall now see,
any attempt to identify and promote a substantive constitutional
level good merely restates, rather than resolves, the already
existing lines of sustained and deep contention in the
constitutional arena.
III. SUBSTANTIVE CONSTITUTIONAL DISPUTES AND THE IDEA OF A
COMMON GOOD
Particularly under the circumstances of our last half-century
or so,99 the existence, recognition, and pursuit of a substantive
constitutional common good has come to seem dubious, if not
futile. At any reasonably broad level of principle and policy,
further investing in the idea of a constitutional common good
evidently avails little.
As a convenient illustration, consider the results of the recent
constitutional drafting project held by the National Constitution
Center.100 In a revealing metaphor, “three teams”101 of recognized
experts were invited to draft what were designated in advance to
be, respectively, conservative,102 libertarian,103 and progressive104
rewrites of the current Constitution. The project thus excluded, at
a minimum, those who are disinclined to see major constitutional
problems and values as matters of preexisting schools of political
thought, or matters of text, as distinct from, say, how any given
constitutional text is to be interpreted.
The conservative, libertarian, and progressive rewrites of the
Constitution jointly illustrate the absence of anything like
common ground as to a meaningful, basic common good at the
constitutional level. This is not surprising, given the gradually
increasing political fragmentation of the last several decades.105

99

See supra Part I.
See
The
Constitution
Drafting
Project,
NAT’L
CONST.
CTR.,
https://constitutioncenter.org/debate/special-projects/constitution-drafting-project
[https://perma.cc/NQF7-KP7V] (last visited Sept. 16, 2022).
101
Id. The project is characterized in terms of a debate. See id.
102
See ROBERT P. GEORGE ET AL., THE CONSERVATIVE CONSTITUTION (2020).
103
See ILYA SHAPIRO ET AL., THE LIBERTARIAN CONSTITUTION (2020).
104
See CAROLINE FREDERICKSON ET AL., THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION (2020).
105
See supra Part I.
100
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But there are substantial constitutional level disputes even within
each of the three designated schools as well.
A.

The Conservative Constitution

Consider, to begin with, a number of themes from the
proposed conservative version of the Constitution. The basic
conservative assumption is that “[a] sound constitution will serve
justice and the common good.”106 This view of course assumes the
existence, sufficient ascertainability, and promotability of a
constitutional common good at a meaningful policy level.
More specifically, this view appears to assume, contrary to
some leading theorists of the common good,107 that justice and the
common good are somehow separate and distinct, and that justice
is not itself an essential element of the common good.108
Intriguingly, in an era of minimal and declining political and
institutional trust,109 the conservative approach also views “the
Constitution [as] a pact of social trust.”110 This may be meant
aspirationally. The conservative Constitution is, as well, thought
to embody an agreement that is itself limited by a higher,
objective, natural law.111 Relying upon any natural law theory,
though, inevitably introduces further controversy at a basic
level.112 This inescapable basic controversy persists whether any
given natural law theory is ultimately correct or not.
106

GEORGE ET AL., supra note 102, at 1.
See supra notes 61–71 and accompanying text.
108
See supra notes 61–71 and accompanying text.
109
See R. George Wright, Trust and Distrust Across Constitutional Law, 36
NOTRE DAME J.L., ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 39, 39 (2022).
110
GEORGE ET AL., supra note 102, at 2.
111
See id.
112
See, e.g., Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 399 (1798) (Iredell, J., concurring in the
judgment and concurring in part) (“The ideas of natural justice are regulated by no
fixed standard . . . .”); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 50 (1980) (“[Y]ou
can invoke natural law to support anything you want.”); Daniel A. Farber, The
Originalism Debate: A Guide For the Perplexed, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1085, 1103 (1989);
Calvin R. Massey, The Natural Law Component of the Ninth Amendment, 61 U. CIN.
L. REV. 49, 49 (1992); Louis Michael Seidman, The Secret History of American
Constitutional Skepticism: A Recovery and Preliminary Evaluation, 17 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 1, 106 (2014). For a classical perspective, see MICHEL DE MONTAIGNE, AN
APOLOGY FOR RAYMOND SEBOND 161–62 (M.A. Screech ed., trans., 1987) (1576).
Montaigne intriguingly observes that “[i]t is quite believable that natural laws
exist . . . . But we have lost them; that fine human reason of ours is always interfering,
seeking dominance and mastery, distorting and confounding the face of everything
according to its own vanity and inconsistency.” Id. To similar effect, see BLAISE
PASCAL, Pensées, in PENSÉES AND OTHER WRITINGS 24 (Honor Levi ed., trans., 1995)
107
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To start, at the level of policy, the proposed conservative
Constitution—controversially among conservatives—endorses
congressional term limits.113 As well, the endorsed conservative
call for a balanced budget amendment114 would have the Supreme
Court judging inherently speculative estimates as to tax receipt
and ill-defined expenditure relationships in a given year, along
with embracing the need for Supreme Court judgments regarding
emergency exceptions.115
It is unclear how comfortable
conservatives should be with any such process. And the practice,
endorsed in the proposed conservative Constitution, of a
voluntary, or else a mandatory, presidential line-item veto116 also
raises separation of powers issues that are controversial among
conservatives.117
Further, a proposed conservative Constitution endorsing
anything like a legislative veto of administration regulations,118
thereby overruling the conservative Chief Justice Burger’s
majority opinion in INS v. Chadha,119 raises similar policy conflicts
and concerns among fellow conservatives.120 And relatedly, what
(1670); JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, A DISCOURSE ON INEQUALITY 69–70 (Maurice
Cranston trans., 1984) (1755). Whether reason itself is the problem, however, is
doubtful.
113
See GEORGE ET AL., supra note 102, at 4. For a discussion at the state level, see
U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 837–38 (1995). A conservative
argument against constitutional term limits for legislators would presumably focus
on the value of electoral democracy and of accumulating legislative seniority through
lived legislative experience.
114
See GEORGE ET AL., supra note 102, at 6–7. The closest case under our present
unamended Constitution is Bowsher v. Synar. 478 U.S. 714, 717–18 (1986).
115
The advisability of anything like a fifty percent of GDP limitation is of course
itself controversial on the merits. See, e.g., Jason Furman & Lawrence Summers, A
Reconsideration of Fiscal Policy in the Era of Low Interest Rates 11 (Nov. 30, 2020)
(unpublished manuscript), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/
furman-summers-fiscal-reconsideration-discussion-draft.pdf [https://perma.cc/5UAG5GHQ]. To the extent that the economics of federal budget deficits and national
indebtedness is increasingly controversial, there is a constitutionally conservative
case not only for caution and prudence, but for avoiding the inscription of inevitably
shifting empirical assessments into the text of the Constitution.
116
See GEORGE ET AL., supra note 102, at 6–7.
117
In the closest case analogue under the current Constitution, the conservative
Chief Justice Rehnquist joined the majority opinion of Justice Stevens, which held
that the 1996 Line Item Veto Act violated the Presentment Clause. See Clinton v. City
of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 420, 421 (1998).
118
See GEORGE ET AL., supra note 102, at 8.
119
462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983).
120
A methodological conservative might, for example, require the exhaustion of
all means of properly asserting congressional legislative authority that have lesser
implications for basic separation of powers relationships among the branches.
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amounts to the effective overruling of the authorization of
administrative adjudicatory power121 in cases of private rights
would also be controversial from a conservative standpoint. There
is, after all, always a conservative interest in relatively narrow
solutions,122 where feasible.
Finally, the proposed conservative Constitution seeks to
reframe the scope of constitutional rights. If anything in this
regard is clear, it is that the scope of such rights will be
fundamentally controversial, whether among conservatives, or
much more broadly, across the political spectrum. The proposed
conservative draft Constitution seeks, prominently, to prohibit
judicial substantive due process,123 understood as the judicial
invention of novel fundamental rights.124 Thus, the courts are to
possess no “general power to create new rights or to
adjudge . . . the reasonableness or wisdom of laws enacted by the
representatives of the people.”125
Here, for conservatives, there is a latent controversy in
prohibiting substantive due process, or the judicial invention of
new fundamental rights more generally, regardless of the
constitutional clause or theory that is invoked.
Some
conservatives will be sympathetic to the idea that as new sorts of
threats to basic individual and broader family relationships
emerge, it may be appropriate to judicially defend the basic
interests at stake in the absence of, or contrary to, statutory law.
The point here is that it will be essentially contestable, among
conservatives and more generally, how any such judicial efforts
should be characterized. For some, such efforts may involve
applying the text of the Constitution, as motivated and informed

Insulating, or not insulating, particular sorts of administrative actors from
presidential removal should also not be viewed as a question that has a distinctive
single conservative answer. See GEORGE ET AL., supra note 102, at 8. See generally
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 686–93 (1988), along with rapidly accumulating
subsequent case law.
121
See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 53–55 (1932); see also ADRIAN VERMEULE,
LAW’S ABNEGATION 25–26 (2016).
122
See, e.g., ROBERT A. DAHL & CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, POLITICS, ECONOMICS,
AND WELFARE 82 (2d ed. 2000).
123
See GEORGE ET AL., supra note 102, at 13.
124
See id.
125
Id. Consider Justice Hugo Black’s famous dictum, quoting Judge Learned
Hand, to the effect that “it would be most irksome to be ruled by a bevy of Platonic
Guardians, even if I knew how to choose them.” Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
526–27 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting) (quoting LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS
73 (1958)).
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by natural law principles,126 to novel circumstances. For others,
though, such judicial efforts may involve instead the benign
exercise of what admittedly amounts, in effect, to substantive due
process.127 Whether a significant new extension of a right amounts
to merely recognizing, or else to creating, a new right is inherently
contestable. And creating, in effect, new rights by judicial appeal
to some other constitutional provision hardly resolves this basic
controversy.
Interestingly, some of the most important emerging
constitutional issues cut across ideological and methodological
lines. Among such important cross-cutting issues is that of the
basic environmental rights of future generations, where
recognizing such rights would require substantial personal
sacrifice by all those persons who are currently well-off.128 Such a
constitutional right could be controversial, to varying degrees,
along various political and jurisprudential axes.129
In any event, it seems clear that the proposed conservative
Constitution must inevitably be controversial at basic levels not
only with the many sorts of non-conservatives, but with many
persons who would qualify as conservative in the relevant sense.
These basic controversies jointly mean that the proposed
conservative Constitution cannot consistently identify—let alone
consistently promote—any reasonably determinate constitutional
level common good. Any judgments thereby at the constitutional
level will inevitably be fundamentally contested by fellow
conservatives, and not merely by many non-conservatives.
Broadly parallel results obtain for the proposed libertarian
and the progressive revisions of the Constitution as well. Below
are merely brief illustrations of the ways in which the libertarian
and progressive revisions inevitably fail to triangulate, even very
generally, on a practically useful understanding of the
constitutional common good.

126

See GEORGE ET AL., supra note 102, at 2, 14.
For the classic groundwork, of course without reference to substantive due
process terminology, see Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 392–95 (1789).
128
That is, where fulfilling the rights of future cohorts requires more than modest,
tokenistic, or symbolic sacrifices by the currently reasonably well off.
129
See generally SAMUEL SCHEFFLER, WHY WORRY ABOUT FUTURE
GENERATIONS? (2018); Tim Mulgan, Ethics for Possible Futures, 114 PROC.
ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 57 (2014); Tim Mulgan, Answering to Future People, 35 J.
APPLIED PHIL. 532 (2018).
127
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B. The Libertarian Constitution
The proposed libertarian Constitution, admittedly, overlaps
in some respects with the conservative Constitution. This
certainly opens the possibility of a degree of commonality. But
these areas of conceptual overlap do not suffice to establish, even
in those particular areas, the existence of a broadly persuasive
constitutional common good.
Thus the proposed libertarian Constitution, like the
conservative version, would, merely for example, call for a
balanced federal budget, emergency circumstances aside.130 More
controversial, even among libertarians more generally, is the
libertarian draft’s general emphasis on “negative” as distinct from
“positive” rights,131 including any purported positive constitutional
rights to education132 or health care.133 One basic problem here is
that being a libertarian does not itself establish the extent to
which one should recognize the positive external effects of various
forms of education and of health care, as provided to many persons
who could not otherwise afford such services.134
The proposed libertarian Constitution then seeks to
emphasize that the general welfare, for constitutional purposes,
should indeed be general, “as opposed to [merely some] parochial
or specific welfare.”135 Here, the basic problem is the large
indeterminacy—if not the sheer practical emptiness—of this
distinction. Verbal distinctions in a constitutional text between
something as nebulous as the general welfare—as distinct from a
factional or large interest group welfare—simply restates, broadly,
the problem of identifying a genuine common good or a genuine
130
See SHAPIRO ET AL., supra note 103, at 2, 7; supra notes 102, 114, 115 and
accompanying text. The libertarian Constitution, however, unlike the conservative
Constitution, ultimately rejects term limits generally. See SHAPIRO ET AL., supra note
103, at 3. But see supra notes 102, 113 and accompanying text.
131
See SHAPIRO ET AL., supra note 103, at 2–3. See generally David P. Currie,
Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 864 (1986). This
approach is controversially supported in the famously divided case of DeShaney v.
Winnebago Cnty., 489 U.S. 189, 195–96 (1989).
132
See, e.g., MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 85–107 (1962).
Friedman’s classic defense of some positive educational rights, largely on grounds of
the positive externalities generated by such rights. Id.
133
Of course, important positive externalities are generated by a wide range of
vaccinations and by the provision of other health goods, including child nutrition, to
persons who could not otherwise afford such goods. See, e.g., Jacobson v.
Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 31–35 (1905).
134
See supra notes 132–133. Correspondingly, the existence of a negative
externality does not begin to tell us how it should be legally addressed.
135
SHAPIRO ET AL., supra note 103, at 5.
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public interest.136 One person’s majority or numerical minority
faction can be another’s general interest.
Similarly, the proposed libertarian Constitution seeks to rely
on the rather technical and indeed murky idea of coercion in
limiting the ability of Congress to induce the states to legislate in
accordance with congressional preferences.137 The problem here is
that while many writers grant that it is possible to coerce a state
by offering or withholding federal funds on a conditional basis,
neither the idea of coercion, nor of coercive offers, is sufficiently
clear to offer reasonably determinate guidance in particular cases.
The classic case law provides merely conclusory announcements of
the supposed presence, or absence, of any illegitimate coercion.138
This indeterminacy is inevitable, given the murkiness,
equivocality, and contestedness of the very idea of coercion and
coercive offers.139
In the realm of individual rights, the proposed libertarian
Constitution would then protect both a right to the “fruits of one’s
labors”140 and a “right to live a peaceful life of one’s choosing.”141
Such purported rights, however, raise familiar broad questions,

136

For a sense of the shifting fashions, compare the characterizations of the
victimized groups of homeowners, compare Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413–
14 (1922) (insufficient genuinely public interest at stake) with Keystone Bituminous
Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictus, 480 U.S. 470, 491–93 (1987) (more sympathetic to finding
the presence of a sufficiently public interest). Compare Home Building & Loan Ass’n
v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 434–35 (1934) (the similarly broadly minded majority
opinion), with Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 240–51 (1978),
(in the Contracts Clause area).
137
See SHAPIRO ET AL., supra note 103, at 5.
138
Compare United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 71 (1936) (finding coercion, or
perhaps undue coercion, in the congressional Spending Clause area), with Steward
Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 592–93 (1937) (finding the absence of coercion).
139
For detailed discussion in the Religion Clause context, see R. George Wright,
Why a Coercion Test Is of No Use in Establishment Clause Cases, 41 CUMB. L. REV.
193 (2010). Some minimal sense of the conceptual-level indeterminacy is provided by,
for example, the various contrasting approaches in J. ROLAND PENNOCK & JOHN W.
CHAPMAN, COERCION (Routledge rep. ed. 2017). See generally ALAN WERTHEIMER,
COERCION (1990).
140
SHAPIRO ET AL., supra note 103, at 10. This opens up the contested relationship
between expropriation and various forms and levels of taxation.
141
Id.
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respectively, of the scope of individual desert,142 and of the
recognition and the proper role of consent and responsibility.143
And finally, the proposed libertarian144 Constitution is in some
key respects insensitive, if not antithetical, to the libertarian
school that would refer to itself as “left-libertarianism.”145 The
proposed libertarian Constitution is more clearly oriented toward
self-ownership and individual autonomy than to left-libertarian
concerns, such as the various forms of social responsibility,
compensation, and equality in the realm of property.146
C. The Progressive Constitution
The third and last of the draft revisions is of a progressive
Constitution.147 Structurally similar, and therefore at this point
unnecessary, observations might be made of a number of the
progressive draft’s proposed revisions. Let us focus briefly on the
indeterminacy of merely one interesting proposal. Consider, in
particular, language from the draft progressive Constitution
itself,148 in the form of a revised First Amendment.149 This revised
First Amendment, in a sense, expands the traditionally recognized
scope of individual rights thereunder by declaring that “everyone
shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and

142
For example, consider the classic debate between RAWLS, supra note 59, at 310
and NOZICK, supra note 80, at 217. See generally GEORGE SHER, DESERT (1987);
James Sterba, Justice as Desert, 3 SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 101 (1974); Robert Young,
Egalitarianism and Personal Desert, 102 ETHICS 319 (1992).
143
For a view of the range of the different approaches taken, see generally THE
ETHICS OF CONSENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE (Franklin G. Miller & Alan Wertheimer
eds., 2010); PETER WESTEN, THE LOGIC OF CONSENT: THE DIVERSITY AND
DECEPTIVENESS OF CONSENT AS A DEFENSE TO CRIMINAL CONDUCT (2004). Consider
also the possibility that “the multiplication of innumerable particular rights can erode
any sense of community and the common good.” BRIAN TIERNEY, THE IDEA OF
NATURAL RIGHTS 346 (1997).
144
See generally JOHN HOSPERS, LIBERTARIANISM (1971); JAN NARVESON, THE
LIBERTARIAN IDEA (3d ed. 2008); MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, THE ETHICS OF LIBERTY
(1982).
145
See generally LEFT-LIBERTARIANISM AND ITS CRITICS: THE CONTEMPORARY
DEBATE (Peter Vallentyne & Hillel Steiner eds., 2000); James P. Sterba, Reconciling
Liberty and Equality, or Why Libertarians Must Be Socialists, in LIBERTY, EQUALITY,
AND PLURALITY 38 (Larry May et al. eds., 1997); Peter Vallentyne et al., Why LeftLibertarianism Is Not Incoherent, Indeterminate, or Irrelevant: A Reply to Fried, 33
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 201 (2005).
146
See supra note 145.
147
See FREDERICKSON ET AL., supra note 104.
148
See id.
149
See id. at 17–18.
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religion.”150
This proposed language suggests a sort of
constitutional equal protection for secular and religious
conscience. To the extent that the free exercise of religion is
accommodated, so, evidently, would be the exercise of nonreligiously based conscience.151 There is certainly much of interest
in any such proposal.
Special attention should be paid, however, to what one might
then call the attending “breadth versus depth problem.” As
writers as politically distinct as Ronald Dworkin152 and Justice
Scalia153 have recognized, extension of a constitutional right in this
area, for the sake of equality, tends in practice to reduce the degree
of stringency of overall constitutional protection for the right in
question.154 Rights of conscience, in general, might then come to
hold only modest traction against democratically enacted good
faith legislative measures.
Consider, in contrast, the
overwhelming initial endorsement of the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act,155 and the Religious Land Use and Rights of
Institutionalized Persons Act156 despite, if not because of, their
relatively stringent protections. But protection of everyone’s
conscience, in contrast, might well quickly become both a mile
wide and an inch deep. Whether this resulting minimization of
conscience protection would be desirable could well be
controversial even among progressives.
Of course, the particular draft conservative, libertarian, and
progressive constitutions do not exhaust the scope of basic-level
approaches to constitutional controversies and conflicts. As
merely one additional approach among others, though, consider a
separate further approach that is explicitly aimed at ascertaining,
and promoting, the common good.157
150

Id.
See id. at 6.
152
See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Rights as Trumps, in THEORIES OF RIGHTS 153–67
(Jeremy Waldron ed., 1984); RONALD DWORKIN, RELIGION WITHOUT GOD 130, 133
(2013).
153
See Emp. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888–89 (1990) (adopting a generally
relaxed Free Exercise test for neutral rules of general applicability).
154
See supra notes 152–153.
155
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb.
156
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc. et seq.
157
See, e.g., ADRIAN VERMEULE, COMMON GOOD CONSTITUTIONALISM (Polity
Press 2022); Adrian Vermeule, Beyond Originalism, ATLANTIC (Mar. 31, 2020),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/03/common-good-constitutionalism/
609037/ [https://perma.cc/G86V-S9BP] [hereinafter Vermeule, Beyond Originalism];
151
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The leading contemporary explicit common good
constitutionalist, Professor Adrian Vermeule, has endorsed “the
principles that government helps direct persons, associations, and
society generally toward the common good, and that strong rule in
the interest of attaining the common good is entirely legitimate.”158
What is widely termed the legislation of morality is, on this
natural law-constrained approach, inevitable and desirable.159
Neither “maximiz[ing] individual autonomy” nor “minimiz[ing]
the abuse of [government authority]” is a primary goal of this
common good oriented government, even assuming that these are
coherent possible aims of any government.160
On this view, duties of justice and prudence require rulers to
promote individual liberties, where appropriate, and where such
liberties are rightly understood as expressions of “the natural
human capacity to act in accordance with reasoned morality.”161 A
form of the classic distinction between negative liberty and

Adrian Vermeule, Common-Good Constitutionalism: A Model Opinion, IUS &
IUSTITIUM (June 17, 2020), https://iusetiustitium.com/common-good-constitutional
ism-a-model-opinion/ [https://perma.cc/XZ6M-2JHM]; Adrian Vermeule, Deference
and the Common Good, MIRROR OF JUST. BLOG (May 8, 2020), https://mirror
ofjustice.blogs.com/mirrorofjustice/2020/05/a-confusion-about-deference.html
[https://perma.cc/GP5E-ZX5X]; Adrian Vermeule, Supreme Court Justices Have
Forgotten What the Law Is For, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/
2022/02/03/opinion/us-supreme-court-nomination.html [https://perma.cc/CC9N-DX
K7] (previewing the author’s forthcoming book entitled, COMMON GOOD
CONSTITUTIONALISM) (hereinafter, Vermeule, Supreme Court Justices); Conor Casey
& Adrian Vermeule, Myths of Common Good Constitutionalism, IUS & IUSTITIUM
(Sept. 9, 2021), https://iusetiustitium.com/myths-of-common-good-constitutionalism/
[https://perma.cc/3TJN-LJ2Z]; see also The Common Good Project, UNIV. OXFORD FAC.
L., https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/research/common-good-project [https://perma.cc/TX7L7LR6] (last visited Sept. 14, 2022). For a brief summary of how government actors in
general might work from broad principle down to more concrete and particular rules,
see Adrian Vermeule, Deference and Determination, IUS & IUSTITUM (Dec. 2, 2020),
https://iusetiustitium.com/deference-and-determination/ [https://perma.cc/2SM7-5L
3F] [hereinafter Vermeule, Deference and Determination]. For broad critique of
Professor Vermeule’s common good constitutional project, see, for example, Sotirios
Barber et al., The Constitution, the Common Good, and the Ambition of Adrian
Vermeule, CONSTITUTIONALIST (Jan. 26, 2021), https://theconstitutionalist.org/
2021/01/26/the-constitution-the-common-good-and-the-ambition-of-adrian-vermeuleby-sotirios-barber-stephen-macedo-and-james-fleming/
[https://perma.cc/H7DC-T6
ZF]; Randy E. Barnett, Common-Good Constitutionalism Reveals the Dangers of Any
Non-Originalist Approach to the Constitution, ATLANTIC (Apr. 3, 2020),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/04/dangers-any-non-originalistapproach-constitution/609382/ [https://perma.cc/FX4L-64LL].
158
Vermeule, Beyond Originalism, supra note 157.
159
See id.
160
See id.
161
See id.
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positive liberty, reflecting authentic desires,162 is therefore of
central relevance.163 Professor Vermeule’s explicit common good
understanding of positive liberty is thus focused on authentic
flourishing, as the embodiment and expression of the common
good, rather than, say, on autonomy164 in the sense of mere absence
of constraint.
The fundamental goal of this explicit common good
constitutionalism is to “promote peace, justice, abundance, health,
and safety, by means of just authority, hierarchy, solidarity, and
subsidiarity.”165 The role of families and other intermediary
association is emphasized,166 along with the correction of the
injustices that result from the play of market forces.167
Professor Vermeule well appreciates that these broad values
do not logically imply any particular substantive statutory
provisions, administrative regulations, or judicial decisions.168
The need to somehow transition from broad values to multiple
levels of increasingly specific legal provisions is clearly recognized
as inescapable. For our purposes, though, the crucial question is
whether Professor Vermeule’s understanding of the common good,
in itself, provides appropriately meaningful guidance and can be
sufficiently broadly appealing in terms of democratic, popular
support.

162
See generally Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in LIBERTY:
INCORPORATING FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 166, 169 (Henry Hardy ed., 2d ed. 2002).
For discussion of liberty as self-actualization according to Rousseau, see John
Plamenatz, “Ce Qui Ne Signifie Autre Chose Sinon Qu’on Le Forcera d’Etre Libre”, in
HOBBES AND ROUSSEAU: A COLLECTION OF CRITICAL ESSAYS 318 (Maurice Cranston
& Richard S. Peters eds., 1972). For the related Marx-Engels conception of false
consciousness, see W. G. Runciman, “False Consciousness”, 44 PHIL. 303, 303 (1969).
For the loosely related broader idea of non-autonomous adaptive preferences, see JON
ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES: STUDIES IN THE SUBVERSION OF RATIONALITY 22 (2016 ed.).
163
See Vermeule, Beyond Originalism, supra note 157.
164
See generally JEROME B. SCHNEEWIND, THE INVENTION OF AUTONOMY: A
HISTORY OF MODERN MORAL PHILOSOPHY (1997).
165
See Vermeule, Beyond Originalism, supra note 157; see also Vermeule,
Supreme Court Justices, supra note 157 (“The aim of constitutional
government . . . should be to promote the classical ideals of peace, justice and
abundance.”).
166
See Vermeule, Beyond Originalism, supra note 157.
167
See id.
168
See generally Deference and Determination, supra note 157 (the discussion of
the types of more, and less, rigorous Thomistic “determination” in Vermeule). See
generally JOHN FINNIS, AQUINAS: MORAL, POLITICAL, AND LEGAL THEORY 266–68
(1988); MONTAIGNE, supra note 112.
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There is here a basic problem. A focus on “peace, justice,
abundance, health, and safety”169 as constituents of the common
good is of starkly limited help if our disputes over what, say,
justice, or genuine abundance, requires are roughly as broad and
fundamental as our disputes over the meaning of the common good
itself. One might well imagine that disputes over what justice
requires, at whatever level, would largely take the place of, or
simply rehash, our familiar contests over what the common good
requires. We cannot settle upon what the common good requires
and then move on to consider what justice requires. Most of the
real work, in any such case, would then be done in resolving what
justice itself requires. The idea of the common good itself would
again contribute little of interest.
Those sympathetic to any natural law-based approach to
justice also recognize that there must be constraints—based in
practical wisdom170 and epistemic humility171—on legally applying
and enforcing even the most fundamental values. But there
remains, as well, what we have seen to be the classic problem

169

Vermeule, Beyond Originalism, supra note 157. But cf. Joseph de Maistre,
Considerations on France, in THE WORKS OF JOSEPH DE MAISTRE 47, 63 (Jack Lively
trans., 1965) (c. 1796) (“[T]he true fruits of human nature—the arts, sciences, great
enterprises, noble ideas, manly virtues—spring above all from the state of war.”);
JUAN DONOSO CORTES, ESSAYS ON CATHOLICISM, LIBERALISM, AND SOCIALISM 236
(William McDonald trans., 1879) (1851) (“In pain there is something fortifying, manly,
and profound, which is the origin of all heroism and of all greatness . . . .”). It has also
been suggested that general population policy can importantly contribute to, or
detract from, the common good. See MOZI, BASIC WRITINGS 66–67 (Burton Watson
trans., 2003) (c. 400 B.C.E.). But few matters are as intractably contested today, at
the constitutional level and elsewhere, as population policy and the public well-being.
170
See, e.g., J. BUDZISZEWSKI, COMMENTARY ON THOMAS AQUINAS’S TREATISE ON
LAW 364–75 (2014) (discussing Summa Theologica Part I-II, Question 96, Art. 2 on
the prudential and moral limits on legal restrictions of immoral activities). Thus, take,
merely as one random example, the lack of any natural law guidance with respect to
legally addressing the fact that there are more civilian firearms in the United States
than there are adults and children. See Christopher Ingraham, There Are More Guns
than People in the United States, WASH. POST (June 19, 2018), https://www.washington
post.com/news/wonk/wp/2018/06/19/there-are-more-guns-than-people-in-the-unitedstates-according-to-a-new-study-of-global-firearm-ownership/
[https://perma.cc/PNW8-ZZ2U].
171
See Sheryl Overmyer, Exalting the Meek Virtue of Humility in Aquinas, 56
HEYTHROP J. 650, 650 (2015) (noting that despite Aquinas’s minimal explicit
attention, “[h]umility appears an anti-modern virtue that can help us address the
problems of the post-modern age”).
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noted by Justice Iredell172 and by John Hart Ely,173 respectively.
Virtually any reasonably popular, or otherwise appealing, public
policy can be said to accord with natural law, natural justice,
reasoned morality, or the common good. What typically results,
given the fundamental indeterminacies, is an argumentative
impasse, rather than meaningful dialogic progress. The result
would obtain whether Professor Vermeule’s approach is,
ultimately, entirely correct or not.
In the end, then, it is fair to conclude that no current school of
thought offers much hope of a serviceable theory of a constitutional
level common good. Perhaps an understanding of the common
good must indeed be central to a legitimate and viable
constitutional regime. But, as a practical matter, we in any case
currently lack any such idea of even a basic level—as opposed to
an elaborated, detailed, or specific level—of a constitutional
common good.
IV. IS THERE A USEFUL ROLE FOR THE BASIC VIRTUES IN
IDENTIFYING AND PROMOTING A CONSTITUTIONAL COMMON
GOOD?

Traditional theories of the common good have often held that
promoting, or even merely seeking, the common good can have the
favorable consequence of encouraging the development of basic
virtues of character.174 On such theories, for example, a soldier
who promotes the community’s common good may thereby develop
the cardinal virtue of courage.175 The problem, however, at least
from our perspective, is clear: if we cannot agree upon any
meaningful understanding of the common good, at any level, we
can hardly rely on pursuing the common good to then catalyze the
development of the basic virtues.
Perhaps, though, the line of causation in this context can be
run in the other direction. Perhaps we can, instead, reasonably
well identify the most basic virtues of character, cultivate those
virtues, and then, from that standpoint, better identify and

172
See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 399 (1798) (Iredell, J., concurring in the
judgment and concurring in part) (“The ideas of natural justice are regulated by no
fixed standard . . . .”).
173
See ELY, supra note 112 (“[Y]ou can invoke natural law to support anything
you want.”).
174
See Duke, supra note 38 at 376 (discussing Aristotle and Aquinas in this
regard).
175
See id.
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promote the common good. This turns out, ultimately, to indeed
be a promising line of inquiry.
The basic character virtues are often assumed, crossculturally, to include prudential wisdom or practical judgment;
courage and fortitude; temperance as reasonable self-restraint;
and justice, understood as the disposition to give everyone what
they are due.176
A constitutional regime that emphasizes
individual liberty and autonomy cannot, beyond a certain point,
distinctively promote the exercise of individual virtue. But it is
also widely thought that the basic cardinal virtues, despite their
conceptual generality, are socially, politically, and even judicially,
necessary.177
Thus, it is said that “the viability of liberal society depends on
its ability to engender a virtuous citizenry.”178 And, more
particularly, that “we need to restore the virtue of prudence to its
rightful place alongside justice as an element of political-moral
decision making.”179 At the level of constitutional decision making
itself, a regime need not require, or even permit, important
officials to freely second-guess the practical wisdom of other
government actors.180 The federal courts in particular often
disclaim any such authority.181 The basic virtues hardly preclude
responsible deference to other official authorities, or to judgments
176

See generally JOSEF PIEPER, THE FOUR CARDINAL VIRTUES: PRUDENCE,
JUSTICE, FORTITUDE, TEMPERANCE (Richard Winston et al. trans., Univ. of Notre
Dame Press 2003); ANDRE COMTE-SPONVILLE, A SMALL TREATISE ON THE GREAT
VIRTUES (Catherine Temerson trans. 2002); VIRTUES AND THEIR VICES (Kevin Timpe
& Craig A. Boyd eds., 2014). For a more psychologically-oriented approach, see
CHRISTOPHER PETERSON & MARTIN E.P. SELIGMAN, CHARACTER STRENGTHS AND
VIRTUES: A HANDBOOK AND CLASSIFICATION (2004).
177
See, e.g., Lyle A. Downing & Robert B. Thigpen, Virtue and the Common Good
in Liberal Theory, 55 J. POL. 1046, 1046 (1993); Robert W. McElroy et al., Civic Virtue
and the Common Good: Forming A Catholic Political Imagination, COMMONWEAL
(May 25, 2018), https://www.commonwealmagazine.org/civic-virtue-common-good
[https://perma.cc/GVW4-LV4R]; Lawrence B. Solum, Virtue Jurisprudence: A VirtueCentered Theory of Judging, 34 METAPHILOSOPHY 178, 192 (2003) (“[T]he good judge
must possess practical wisdom in her selection of the proper legal ends and means.”);
see also JOHN OF SALISBURY, POLICRATICUS 175 (Cary J. Nederman ed., 1990) (c.
1159) (“[N]othing except virtue is more glorious than liberty, if however liberty is ever
properly separated from virtue.”).
178
Downing & Thigpen, supra note 177 (quoting the political scientist William
Galston). This seems also likely true of non-liberal societies as well.
179
McElroy et al., supra note 177.
180
See, e.g., Vermeule, Deference and Determination, supra note 157 (regarding
administrative decisions requiring agency expertise in particular).
181
See, e.g., Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2129 (2019); Eldred v.
Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 222 (2003); Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417, 447 (1998);
Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978).
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of private actors.182 But to the extent that it may be compatible
with constitutional regime ideology, governments can encourage
the development and exercise of basic virtues among the public in
general, perhaps thereby indirectly promoting whatever
understandings of the common good may result from such a virtueinfused deliberative processes. As persons develop and exercise
the basic character virtues, perhaps the overall sense of what the
common good, rightly understood, requires may then be catalyzed,
and evolve. Crucially, to the extent that any of the basic virtues,
especially practical wisdom, involve a disposition to seek and
promote the common good, whatever the common good may
substantively turn out to be, that disposition, paradoxically, itself
helps to constitute the common good.
The problem here is that the process of encouraging what are
assumed to be basic virtues among members of the public would
have to take place under our actual contemporary circumstances
of broad distrust, mutual alienation, unusual polarization,
fragmentation, and animating hostility.183 Virtues such as
practical wisdom, courage, reasonable self-restraint, and justice as
a disposition of character do not come unmistakably labeled as
such. We may be currently disposed to refuse to recognize, or to
publicly acknowledge, even the largely descriptive184 qualities of
wisdom, courage, reasonable self-restraint, or justice in persons
we politically disdain or even detest.185 Under our contemporary
circumstances, it may well be exceptionally difficult to disentangle
ardent political opposition from the broadly beneficial process of
recognition, admiration, endorsing, and emulation of the basic
virtues.
But the basic virtues, reasonably understood, tend helpfully,
and indeed inevitably, to bob recurringly to the cultural surface.
182
Consider, for example, the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Burger in Plyler
v. Doe, in which the State of Texas refused to offer free public school education to
undocumented immigrant children. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 242–43 (1982)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger recognized the foolishness and
immorality of Texas’ exclusionary policy. See id. But the constitutional structure did
not, on Chief Justice Burger’s view, authorize the Court to pass judgment on the
wisdom, as distinct from the constitutionality, of the state policy in question. See id.
at 243.
183
See supra Introduction–Part I.
184
See generally Pekka Vayrynen, Thick Ethical Concepts, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA
PHIL. (rev. ed. Feb. 9, 2021), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/thick-ethical-concepts/
[https://perma.cc/WN9A-AY88].
185
Imagine fervent mutual opponents saying of one another, without equivocation
or qualification, that they display admirable wisdom, courage, or fortitude.
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The cultivation of genuine virtue normally tends to strengthen the
persons and groups directly affected—conferring on such groups a
certain cultural- evolutionary survival advantage. And then,
crucially, cultivation of basic virtues by some groups or persons
also has important favorable “spill-over” effects for other groups.
As one or more groups cultivate basic virtues, they thereby
increasingly emphasize—initially among themselves—thoughtful,
reflective decision making; reasonable self-restraint, as distinct
from both self-indulgence and self-sabotage; courage as the
avoidance of both irrational recklessness and timidity; and a
desire to accord to all persons and groups what they are thought
to be due. All of these virtues then tend, in general though not in
all instances, to confer external benefits on society as a whole and
to upgrade the quality of overall deliberation and collective
decisions. The search for, and implementation of, a common good
is promoted when the basic virtues are first narrower, and then
generally, more prominent. The cultivation of basic virtues—
initially even among limited groups—can thus eventually
generate a “virtuous circle.”
It might seem that the cultivation of genuine basic virtues by
one’s political antagonists would tend simply to make them more
formidable opponents. But if one’s antagonists had greater
practical wisdom, would they not tend to moderate their own
supposed extremism? Would we not instead prefer, in our political
antagonists, greater responsibility and sobriety?
And an
enhanced sense of appropriate epistemic humility and selfdiscipline? Or a lesser inclination to exhibit inappropriate panicresponses, the various cognitive biases in judgment, and general
self-indulgence?
We might well not prefer genuinely more courageous
opponents. We might prefer that they be timid, feckless,
distractable, and irresolute. But even these latter qualities pose
broad public risks. And the absence of genuine courage in our
political opponents may equally take the form of rashness or
impulsiveness, to a broad public cost. And would we not then, in
general, view such persons and groups as more promising partners
in constitutional level dialogue and debate? A society that is
increasingly reflective of the basic virtues should tend to promote
progress toward some sensible collective understanding of the
common good.
Consider, more concretely, a hypothetical political convention
held by a party that one strongly disfavors. The distinctive thing
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about this convention, though, lies in the basic character of its
delegates. The delegates to this hypothetical convention of one’s
antagonists are widely recognized, all else equal and despite their
repugnant political views, as among the most prudent,
intellectually careful and responsible, reasonably self-restrained,
genuinely courageous, and personally just persons. Bearing in
mind one’s general opposition to the party’s ideology, and all else
again equal, would it really be reasonable to have expectations for
the outcome of this convention that are no more favorable than one
would entertain in the case of more typical, and distinctly less
virtuous, convention attendees?
CONCLUSION
American constitutional law has long assumed both the
coherence and the importance of some idea of a common good.
Consider just a few instances. On Justice Thomas’ accounting,
“[t]he Framers believed that a proper government promoted the
common good.”186 In the well-known public interest regulatory
case Munn v. Illinois,187 the Court defined the body politic itself in
terms of a covenant to respect and uphold the common good.188 The
use right at stake in Munn was said to be limited by the statutory
pursuit of the common good.189
The classic “mandatory”
vaccination case of Jacobson v. Massachusetts190 was, as well,
premised on the legitimacy of a state’s pursuit of the common
good.191 Even in the Lochner case,192 the importance of promoting
the common good was recognized in dissent by Justice Harlan.193

186
Evenwel v. Abbott, 578 U.S. 54, 84 (2016) (Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment) (citing Alexander Hamilton on the public good and the community’s
genuine interests). On Justice Thomas’ approach, promoting the common good
requires government identification of, and protection of, fundamental rights, with
majority sentiment perhaps set aside. See id.
187
94 U.S. 113, 125–26 (1876).
188
See id. at 124.
189
See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 660–63 (1887).
190
197 U.S. 11 (1905).
191
See id. at 26, 27.
192
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
193
See id. at 65, 67 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“There are manifold restraints to
which every person is necessarily subject for the common good.”) (quoting Jacobson,
197 U.S. at 26).
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The language of pursuing the constitutional common good
maintains its judicial presence today.194
In a deeply and increasingly divided society, however,195 a
meaningful constitutional-level common good may well be both
increasingly important,196 and increasingly elusive.197
This
paradox has been explored above. There seems no obvious escape
from this paradox at the level of constitutional theory, doctrine, or
ideology. There may, however, be a path to daylight through an
eventually broad-based cultivation of the widely recognized basic
virtues of character. To the extent that contending groups and
factions cultivate, even initially within themselves, the basic
virtues, they inevitably tend, intentionally or not, to strengthen
the likelihood that progress can be made among groups in
recognizing and promoting, at the constitutional level, the
common good.

194
See, e.g., Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005) (regulatory
taking for the perceived common good); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003,
1019 (1992) (compensable taking for the sake of the public good); Big Tyme Invs.,
L.L.C., v. Edwards, 985 F.3d 456, 466 (5th Cir. 2021) (COVID-19 pandemic public
health regulation discussing the Jacobson case); Mather v. Vill. of Mundelein, 864
F.2d 1291, 1297 (7th Cir. 1989) (Coffey, J., concurring) (stating, in the context of free
exercise of religion, that “[i]t is a central tenet of democracy that a majority of the
people can act for the common good, while, at the same time, respecting and not
infringing upon the rights of the minority.”).
195
See supra Introduction–Part I.
196
See, e.g., Maximillian Jaede, The Concept of the Common Good 1 (Pol.
Settlements Rsch. Programme, Working Paper No. 8, 2017) (“[I]n deeply divided
societies, there is a need to construct a shared notion of the ‘common good’ . . . .”).
197
See supra Parts II–III.

